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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to determine how John
Adams's political philosophy influenced his ideas on
diplomacy, and how his experiences as a diplomat during the
American Revolution affected his political philosophy.
John Adams was a republican, which, among other
things, meant that he was committed to the idea of a
balance between branches of government to preserve liberty.
Similarly, Adams believed that a balance of power among
nations was necessary to preserve American independence.
Adams also believed that virtue was necessary for a
republic. However, as the United States became more
dependent on its French ally, Adams came to realize that
Americans were not especially virtuous, and believed even
more in the need for a balance of power. Political
philosophy and diplomatic experience reinforced each other,
in that they both led Adams to the conclusion that a
balance of power was essential to preserve liberty and
independence.
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A REPUBLICAN ABROAD:
JOHN ADAMS AND THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

Throughout his public career, John Adams remained a
committed republican. Republicanism, to Adams and his
contemporaries, meant more than just abolishing a
hereditary monarch and nobility. Republicanism was an
ideology that shaped the way its adherents viewed the
world. Belief in the eternal struggle between power and
liberty, and in the need for public virtue to support
liberty, were at the center of republican ideology.1 John
Adams's thought fell within these general guidelines, and
Adams made the need for a balance of power to preserve
liberty a central theme in his theoretical works on
government.

*

In neither his 1776 pamphlet Thoughts on Government
nor his 1787-1788 book A Defence of the Constitutions of
Government of the United States of America does Adams
discuss the nature of republican diplomacy. However,
republican ideology led Adams to view domestic and foreign
R o b e r t E. Shalhope. "Republicanism and Early American
Historiography," William and Marv Quarterly. 3rd Series, Vol.
XXXIX, no. 2 (April, 1982). p.334-335.
2

3

policy in the same light. If republican ideology taught
Adams to fear the powers of his native government, it
taught him to fear foreign powers even more. Adams
concluded that the United States could not afford to help
either France or Great Britain become the predominant power
in the world. In actual operation, Adams's pursuit of a
balance of power diplomacy looked like traditional British
diplomacy. However, British diplomacy had no philosophical
basis, and was based on practicality, not ideology. 2
Adams arrived at a belief in a balance of power by viewing
the world through a republican lens.
Adams was not as certain about American virtue as he
was about the need for a balance of power. Adams veered
between optimism about American virtue in 1775 and 1776 and
a deep pessimism in the 1780s. During his first five years
in Europe, Adams saw the Continental Congress as
increasingly indecisive and subservient to France. Adams,
like many Americans, considered the years 1775 and 1776 a
golden age of virtue, and that whatever special virtue the
Americans had was used up in the drive toward
•

independence.

7

.

.

.

Adams's fear of a decline in American

virtue is evident in his letters home from Europe between

2David Bayne Horn. Great Britain and Europe in the Eight
eenth Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 383.
JEdmund S. Morgan. "The Puritan Ethic and the American
Revolution,11 William and Marv Quarterly. 3rd Series, Vol.
XXIV, no. 1 (January, 1967). p.19.
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1778 and 1788. His Defence of the Constitutions is the
fullest expression of his belief in the ability and the
necessity of a balanced government to counteract the lack
of virtue.
While in Europe, Adams faced the task of preserving
the independence and potential for growth of a small power
by playing two larger powers against each other. Adams
hoped to use the United States's only real weapon, its
trade, to lure France into the war by offering the French a
chance to increase their power relative to Great Britain.
Later, when a close connection with France threatened to
suffocate the newborn United States, Adams again used
American trade to force Great Britain to come to terms,
lest the United States permanently cast its lot with the
French. As a republican at home, Adams sought to preserve
liberty through a balanced constitution. As a republican
abroad, Adams sought to preserve American independence by
balancing France against Great Britain, by making American
trade too valuable for one power to let the other dominate
it. Adams pursued a diplomacy that was traditionally
British in operation, but republican in outlook.

PART I

A VIRTUOUS REPUBLIC

John Adams, like many Americans in the Revolutionary
era, believed that America was set apart from other nations
and had a special mission. "I always consider the
settlement of America with Reverence and Wonder,” wrote
Adams in an unused fragment from his 1765 pamphlet, A
Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, "as the Opening
of a grand scene and design in Providence, for the
Illumination of the Ignorant and the Emancipation of the
slavish Part of Mankind all over the Earth."4 This belief
came in part from Adams' cyclical view of history, where
one nation would rise, have its day as a great empire, and
then give way to another nation. The center of power passed
from Assyria to Egypt to Greece to Rome to France to
England. America was the next step, as America was a young
nation, just beginning its rise to power. Each new empire
built on the previous one, and America would build her
empire on British ruins. The American Revolution
4John Adams. Diary and Autobiography of John Adams. 4 vols.
L.H. Butterfield, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1961), 1:257.
5

6

marked the first step toward its goal.5 In this way, the
American Revolution was an act of self-preservation: the
only way to preserve American power and virtue was to break
•
•
•
away from a declining
Great Britain.

6

How to preserve American liberty against all efforts
at tyranny, both foreign and domestic, was the problem that
faced John Adams throughout the American Revolution. Adams
found his solution in the concept of balance. To prevent
domestic attempts at tyranny, Adams advocated a
constitution of separate branches, with power balanced
among them. To prevent foreign encroachments on American
liberty, Adams advocated American participation in the
European balance of power, not by engaging in Europe's
wars, but by making American independence too valuable to
all European powers for any one power to threaten it.
Adams shared the Whig notion that the central question
of politics was the distribution of power. Whig theory
defined the minimum amount of power each man deserved as
liberty. To maintain liberty, power must be dispersed as
widely as possible, so that no one would receive more than
his share.7 For Adams, power was the ability to control
5John R. Howe, Jr. The Changing Political Thought of John
Adams (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966),
36-44.
6Gordon S. Wood. The Creation of the American Republic. 17761787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969),
108.
'ibid, 21-22.
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others. Power was naturally aggressive and expansive, and
gained at the expense of liberty and right.8 Adams, in A
Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal L a w , described power
as the "Desire of Dominion, that encroaching, grasping,
restless and ungovernable Principle which has made so much
Havock and Desolation.1,9 "Power naturally grows. Why?"
Adams wrote to Roger Sherman. "Because human passions are
insatiable. But that power alone can grow which is already
too great; that which is unchecked; that which has no equal
to control it."10 This fear of unchecked power, and the
historical examples of Julius Caesar and Oliver Cromwell,
led to a fear of standing armies.11
A balanced republic could restrain power, but, Adams
believed, a republic had to be founded on virtue.12 "The
Preservation of Liberty depends upon the intellectual and
moral Character of the People," Adams wrote in his notes
for a speech in Braintree in 1772. "As long as Knowledge
and Virtue are diffused generally among the Body of a
Nation, it is impossible they should be enslaved."13
8Bernard Bailyn. The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1967), 55-59.
°John Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 1:255-256.
10John Adams to Roger Sherman, July 18, 1789, in John Adams,
The Works of John Adams. 10 Vols. Charles Francis Adams, e d .
/Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1850-1856), 6:431.
11Bailyn, Ideological Origins of American Revolution. 63.
12Peter Shaw. The Character of John Adams (Chapel Hill: Univ
ersity of North Carolina Press, 1976), 92.
13John Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 2:58.
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People who remained virtuous and vigilant were able to
balance the forces in society and maintain their liberty.
Americans praised the British constitution for its ability
to balance the forces of monarchy, aristocracy and
democracy, represented by the crown, lords and commons.14
However, in the late-eighteenth century the British seemed
to have lost their virtue. The degeneration of the British
people allowed the crown to grow too powerful, and the
crown in turn corrupted the House of Lords and House of
Commons, destroying the balance of power.15 The republics
of Greece and Rome had similarly grown corrupt and fallen
in turn, as the loss of freedom quickly followed the loss
of virtue.16 But were the Americans up to the task? Did
they have enough virtue to maintain a republic? Adams
always had doubts about American virtue, doubts that became
more pronounced over time. However, in the 1770s, Adams
believed the Americans were virtuous, or at least that the
American Revolution would create virtue. "It may be the
Will of Heaven that America shall suffer Calamaties still
more wasting and Distresses yet more dreadfull," Adams
wrote to his wife Abigail after Congress agreed to declare
independence; "If this be the Case, it will have this good
14Bailyn, Ideological Origins of American Revolution. 65-77.
15Wood, Creation of the American Republic. 52.
16H. Trevor Colbourn. The Lamp of Experience (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 25.
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Effect, at least: it will inspire Us with many Virtues,
which We have not, and correct many Errors, Follies, and
Vices, which threaten to disturb, dishonour, and destroy
Us."17
One reason the Americans had the capacity for virtue
was that they were a young and agricultural people. Adams
sympathized with the French Physiocratic view that land
•
.
18
ownership was the basis of wealth. ° Adams preferred
agriculture even to New England's lifeblood, the fishing
industry. Although Adams agreed the fisheries were a prime
source of wealth, he wrote to Ralph Izard, "Agriculture is
the most essential interest of America, and even of the
Massachusetts Bay, and it is very possible to injure both,
by diverting too much of the Thoughts and Labor of the
People, from the cultivation of the Earth, to Adventures
upon the Sea."19 Adams believed commerce tended to
subvert virtue, and hence subvert republicanism. He wrote
of the "Spirit of Commerce," to Mercy Otis Warren, arguing
this spirit was, "incompatible with that purity of
17John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 3, 1776, in L.H. Butter
field and Marc Friedlaender, eds. Adams Family Correspond
ence . 4 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1963-1973), 2:28.
18Zoltan Haraszti. John Adams and the Prophets of Progress
/Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), 11.
John Adams to Ralph Izard, Sept. 25, 1778, in John Adams,
Papers of John Adams. 8 vols. to date. Robert J. Taylor, et
al, eds. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1977.),7:73.
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Heart, and Greatness of soul, which is necessary for a
happy Republic•"2 0
Adams did have his doubts about American virtuousness.
Through the study of moral philosophers, and his own
observations, Adams saw that emotion often ruled over
reason.21 Americans were not immune. "Virtue and
Simplicity of Manners are indespensably necessary in a
Republic, among all orders of Men," Adams wrote to Mercy
Otis Warren, "But there is so much Rascallity, so much
Venality and Corruption, so much Avarice and Ambition, such
a rage for Profit and Commerce among all Ranks and Degrees
of Men even in America, that I sometimes doubt whether
there is public virtue enough to support a Republic."22
However, the high ideals of the Revolution helped
temporarily remove those doubts. "Human nature, with all
its infirmities and deprevation, is capable of great
things," he wrote Abigail, "it is capable of attaining to
degrees of wisdom and of goodness, which we have reason to
believe, appear respectable in the estimation of superior
,
n ->
intelligences.J
Given that all men seek to acguire power, and that
20John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, April 16, 1776, in John
Adams, Papers. 4:125
21Howe, Changing Political Thought of John Adams. 16-18.
22John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, Jan. 8, 1776, in John
Adams, Papers, 3:398.
23John Adams to Abigail Adams, Oct. 29, 1775, in Butterfield
and Friedlaender, eds. Adams Family Correspondence. 1:317.
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even the most virtuous should not be trusted with unlimited
power, a republic had to balance power and uphold the rule
of law.24 To Adams, an example of such a repulic was the
British constitution. Adams wrote in his "Novanglus" essays
in early 1775 that the "republican spirit ... is a spirit
of true virtue and independence.

... This spirit is so far

from being incompatible with the British constitution, that
it is the greatest glory of it, and the nation has always
been most prosperous when it has most prevailed and been
most encouraged by the crown."25 Adams concluded from
this observation that, "the British constitution is much
more like a republic than an empire. They [Aristotle, Livy
and Harrington] define a republic to be a government of
laws, and not of m e n . If this definition is just, the
British constitution is nothing more or less than a
republic, in which the king is nothing more than the first
magistrate."2 6
The American Revolution did not intend to destroy
society as it stood under the British constitution. Indeed,
in the face of British decay, the Americans sought to
preserve the British constitution, even if the British
themselves chose to abandon it.27 The problem now facing
24Howe, Changing Political Thought of John Adams. 90-93.
25"Novanglus," Jan.-April, 1775, in John Adams, Papers, 2:278.
26"Novanglus," Jan.-April, 1775, in ibid. 2:314.
27Bailyn, Ideological Origins of American Revolution. 19.
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Adams and other American leaders was how to construct a
government that could maintain a social order in the midst
of a potentially socially disruptive event such as the
American Revolution.28 Adams believed he found his answer
in a balanced government, something of a purified British
constitution. Adams wrote to Richard Henry Lee, "a
Legislative, an Executive and a judicial Power, comprehend
all of what is meant and understood by Government. It is by
balancing each of these Powers against the other two, that
the effort in human Nature towards Tyranny alone can be
checked and restrained and any degree of Freedom preserved
in the Constitution." Adams recommended that the lower
house of the legislature be popularly elected, that the
upper house, or council, should be chosen by the lower
house, and that the governor should be chosen by both
O Q

houses.

Adams expanded on these ideas in his first theoretical
work, Thoughts on Government, which began as a letter to
George Wythe and emerged as a pamphlet in April of
1776.

on

.

.

.

.

Adams implied virtue was necessary to implement

his model, writing that, "the noblest principles and most
generous affections in our nature then, have the fairest
O Q

,

,

,

* Howe, Changing Political Thought of John Adams. 7-8.
29John Adams to Richard Henry Lee, Nov. 15, 1775, in John
Adams, Papers, 3:307.
30"Thoughts on Government," editorial note, in John Adams,
Papers, 4:65-66.
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chance to support the noblest and most generous models of
government." Adams linked his ideas of the republican
nature of the British constitution to his theory of
government, and emphasized the rule of law. He wrote, "that
form of government, which is best contrived to secure an
impartial and exact execution of the laws, is the best of
Republics."31
Adams' suspicion of human nature led him to advocate a
bicameral legislature. "A single assembly is liable to all
the vices, follies and frailties of an individual," wrote
Adams, "subject to fits of humour, starts of passion,
flights of enthusiasm, partialities of prejudice, and
consequently productive of hasty results and absurd
judgement." However, a properly balanced government could
act as guarantor of virtue. Adams advocated laws for
promoting education, and, to keep the spirit of luxury and
commerce under control, sumptuary laws. "Frugality is a
great revenue," wrote Adams, "besides curing us of
vanities, levities, and fopperies which are antidotes to
all great, manly and warlike virtues."32 A constitution,
Adams concluded, could be a great inspiration to the
people. A properly designed constitution could, "make the
31"Thoughts on Government," in ibid. 4:86-87.
32"Thoughts on Government," in ibid. 4:88, 91.
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common people brave and enterprizing. That ambition which
is inspired by it makes them sober, industrious, and
frugal."33
In 1779, between his two tours of duty in Europe,
Adams had the opportunity to design a government for
Massachusetts. Adams' contributions to constitution-making
included the division of the constitution into articles and
sections.34 Adams, in the preamble, again emphasized the
rule of law, writing that the constitution was to "provide
for an equitable mode of making laws, as well as for an
impartial interpretation; and a faithful execution of them,
that every man, at all times, find his security in
them."35 Adams included many of his ideas from "Thoughts
on Government," such as a bicameral legislature, an
independent judiciary, a strong executive, and, to
encourage virtue, support for public education. °
The constitution of Massachusetts marked the most
concrete of Adams' efforts to establish balanced
government, and, like Adams' earlier works, reflects a fair
amount of optimism about American virtue, with some
safeguards to prevent, or at least mitigate, a decline in
virtue. However, Adams' years abroad brought out more fully
33"Thoughts on Government," in ibid. 4:92.
3 Massachusetts Constitution, editorial note, in ibid. 8:231.
3Massachusetts Constitution, in ibid. 8:237.
3Massachusetts Constitution, in ibid. 8:237-261.

his pessimism about American virtue. By the mid-1780'
Adams changed some his perceptions about America,
especially in regard to American virtue and American
commercial activity.

PART II

A COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC

During John Adams's time in Europe, his views of
America had changed, or rather, he believed that America
itself had changed. By the 1780s Adams put his faith more
in virtuous leaders than in the virtue of the American
people. Adams concluded that the American people were not
especially virtuous and could not escape the common fate of
Europe.37 America's failure to overcome French influence
m

•

foreign affairs was a result of the loss of virtue.

'J O

Adams held out little hope for a moral regeneration. "Moral
Reflections, wise Maxims, religious Terrors, have little
effect upon Nations when they contradict present Passion,
Prejudice, Imagination, Enthusiasm or Caprice," Adams wrote
to Thomas Jefferson; "I have long been settled in my own
opinions, that neither Philosophy, nor Religion, nor
Morality, nor Wisdom, nor Interest, will ever govern
nations or Parties, against their Vanity, their Pride,
their Resentment, or Revenge, or their Avarice or Ambition.
37Wood, Creation of the American Republic. 569-574.
38Howe, Changing Political Thought of John Adams. 130-131.
16
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Nothing but force and Power and Strength can restrain
oq
,
,
,
them.”'*17 If American society was not virtuous, Adams and
other American leaders had to determine what American
society was and how to organize a republic around it.
Adams, like other American thinkers, believed each
society passed through four stages: hunting, pasturage,
agriculture and commerce. Commercial society brought wealth
and sophistication, but also brought luxury, which
undermined virtue. Thomas Jefferson and his supporters
believed that a republic could exist only at stage three.
Jefferson believed that European nations turned to
manufacturing and commerce only when they ran out of arable
land. The United States had enough land to grow wealthy
from agriculture, and therefore need not turn to
manufacturing.40 Therefore, Jefferson preferred farming
as a profession, almost to the total exclusion of
manufacturing and shipping. In his famous Notes on the
State of Virginia. Jefferson wrote that, "those who labor
in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a
chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar
deposit for substantial and genuine virtue." Manufacturing
had no place in Jefferson's America, and he preferred to
O Q

,

J^John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 9, 1787, m Lester J.
Cappon, ed. The Adams-Jefferson Letters (Chapel Hill: Univers
ity of North Carolina Press, 1988), 202-203.
40Drew R. McCoy. The Elusive Republic (Chapel Hill: Univers
ity of North Carolina Press, 1980), 10, 14, 19-22.
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"let our work-shops remain in Europe."41 Jefferson did
favor commerce, but to Jefferson "commerce" meant
transporting American agricultural products to Europe. How
they got there was of little importance, and Jefferson
seems to have wanted Europeans rather than Americans to do
the carrying. Jefferson wrote to John Jay that Americans
should be farmers, and while there was land to till, "I
would not convert them into mariners." Further, Jefferson
argued, if Americans engaged in the carrying trade, the
United States would be dragged into Europe's wars.
Jefferson preferred that "foreign nations ... be invited to
bring us what we want and to take our productions in their
own bottoms."42 On the other end of the spectrum,
Alexander Hamilton wanted the United States to move into
stage four, the commercial and manufacturing stage.
Hamilton foresaw a great nation based on industrial and
financial power rather than agrarian virtue. Unlike
Jefferson, Hamilton rejected the model of the classical
republic.43
John Adams can be seen something of a transitional
figure in this debate. Adams might have railed against the
4T h o m a s Jefferson. Notes on the State of Virginia (1787).
William Peden, ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carol
ina Press, 1955), 164-165.
42Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, Aug. 23, 1785, in Thomas
Jefferson, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. Vol. 8. Julian
Boyd, ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1953), 426-427.
3McCoy, Elusive Republic. 132-134.
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“spirit of commerce” in his early writings, but he sought
to control its effects, not eliminate commerce. Adams might
have sypmpathized with Jefferson's agrarianism as an ideal,
but he believed that America was already a commercial
nation.44 "Our Country is grown," Adams lamented to
Cotton Tufts.45

The American character could not have

changed so drastically between the 1770s and 1780s, and
Adams concluded, like Hamilton, that the Americans had
never been or would ever be fit for Samuel Adams'
"Christian Sparta." America would probably be better off as
a result.46 "It is most certain that our Countrymen are
not and never were, Spartans in their Contempt of Wealth,
and I will go farther and say they ought not to be," Adams
wrote to James Warren, "Such a trait in their Character
would render them lazy Drones unfit for the Agriculture,
Manufactures, Fisheries, and Commerce, and Population of
the ir Country."4 7
Adams believed a healthy American economy depended on
agriculture, shipping, and manufactures. Unlike Jefferson,
who wanted to depend on foreigners for the last two,
44Howe, Changing Political Thought of John Adams. 133-134.
45John Adams to Cotton Tufts, July 4, 1786, Adams Family
Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Letterbook, reel
H 3*
McCoy, Elusive Republic. 71-72, 97.
47John Adams to James Warren, July 4, 1786, in Warren-Adams
Letters. 2 vols. (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society,
Collections. LXXII-LXXIII, 1917-1925), 2:277.
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Adams believed that the American economy should, as much as
possible, be controlled by Americans. "I wish We were wise
enough,” Adams wrote to Cotton Tufts,” to depend on
ourselves for every Thing, and upon them [Europeans] for
nothing."48 While Adams portrayed America as an
agricultural nation to the Count de Vergennes, he also
cited American interest in shipping, if, "only to carry the
.
dQ
produce of their lands ... to the European market."*1*
In his economic thought, Adams was no doubt influenced
by the economic situation of New England in the eighteenth
century. "My Practice as a Barrister in the Counties of
Essex, Plymouth and Barnstable," Adams wrote in his
autobiography, "had introduced me to more Knowledge both of
the Cod and whale fisheries and their importance to the
commerce and Naval Power of this Country than any other man
possessed.1,50 Adams's statement reflects the importance
of fishing to New England. Not only did the fisheries give
New England a "crop" for export, but by transporting fish
in their own boats, New Englanders cut their trade deficit
with Great Britain. Lack of agricultural products led New
Englanders to develop America's first service industry, the
48John Adams to Cotton Tufts, Dec. 9, 1780, Adams Family
Papers, Letterbook, reel 102.
49John Adams to the Count de Vergennes, quoted in Charles
Francis Adams. The Life of John Adams. 2 vols. (Philadelphia:
J.B. Lippencott and Co., 1871), 1:460.
50John Adams, Diary and Autobiaraohv. 4:5.
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carrying trade, providing ships and cargo space for others.
New Englanders engaged in fanning and manufacturing to meet
their immediate needs and made their money off the carrying
trade.51 For Adams, the diverse New England economy
reflected the future American economy. He wrote Rufus King,
"Agriculture, Manufactures and Commerce with one another
will make us flourish."
This statement is not to suggest that Adams shaped his
republican beliefs around New England's economic interests.
The advanced state of New England's economy gave Adams a
perspective Jefferson did not have. Jefferson could look
out his window and see the uncultivated land needed to keep
America an agricultural republic and the corrupting
influence of commerce away. Adams saw commerce already
well-established and could, with less trouble, picture a
commercial republic. If commercialism undermined virtue,
Americans had to construct what Gordon Wood calls, "a new
and original sort of republican government," one that did
not depend on virtue for its success.53
In many ways Adams's three-volume work, A Defence of
the Constitutions of Government of the United States of
51John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard. The Economy of
British America 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1985), 72, 92, 100, 110.
5 John Adams to Rufus King, June 14, 1786, Adams Family
Papers, Letterbook, reel 113.
Wood, Creation of the American Republic. 475.
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America, published in 1787-1788, is an attempt to come to
terms with the idea of a non-virtuous republic. Adams wrote
the Defence in response to the French philospher Turgot,
who criticized the United States for following British
forms too closely.54 Adams responded by praising the
British constitution, writing, "I only contend that the
British constitution is, in theory ... the most stupendous
fabric of human invention; and that the Americans ought to
be applauded instead of censured, for imitating it as far
as they have done.”55
J.G.A. Pocock calls Adams's Defence of the
Constitutions the last major work of classical
republicanism.56 However, in the first passages, Adams
noted the differences between the classical and modern
worlds. "The inventions in mechanic arts, the discoveries
in natural philosophy, navigation, and commerce, and the
advancement of civilization and humanity," Adams wrote,
"have occasioned changes in the condition of the world,
which would have astonished the most refined nations of
antiquity."57 The most recent change, and probably among
the most urgent to Adams, was the increase of wealth and
commerce in the United States. Such a change would have
54Howe, Changing Political Thought of John Adams. 166.
55"Defence," vol. 1, in John Adams, Works. 4:358.
J.G.A. Pocock. The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1975), 526.
57"Defence," vol 1, in John Adams, Works. 4:283.
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ruined a classical republic, but Adams believed that a
balanced constitution could offset the effects of commerce
in a modern republic. "In the late war, the Americans found
an unusual quantity of money flow in upon them, without the
least degree of prudence, foresight, consideration, or
measure, rushed headlong into a greater degree of luxury
than ought to have crept in for a hundred years," Adams
wrote, "... In a country like America, where means and
opportunities for luxury are so easy and so plenty, it
would be madness not to expect it, be prepared for it, and
provide against the dangers of it in the constitution."58
Adams again portrayed a balanced government as
guarantor of liberty. In Defence of the Constitutions,
balance took on the tone of protecting the few and the many
against each other. In a single assembly, commoner and
noble would battle for power and destroy liberty. "Whether
the assembly consists of a larger or smaller number of
nobles or commons, of great people or little, of rich or
poor, of substantial men or the rabble, the effects are all
the same," Adams wrote, "No order, no safety, no liberty.
C Q

,

because no government of law."^17 Adams again gave England
as the best example of such a balanced government, writing,
58"Defence," vol. 3, in ibid. 6:96.
59"Defence," vol. 2, in ibid, 5:288-289.
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"we have seen one of the first nations in Europe ... which
has still preserved the power of the people by the
equilibrium we are contending for, by the trial by jury,
and by constantly refusing a standing army.60
Unlike James Madison, Adams does not seem to have
given much consideration to the amount of territory needed
to maintain a balanced government. Madison, in the tenth
Federalist, argued that a republic needed to be physically
large to multiply and diffuse factions. "Extend the
sphere," Madison wrote, "and you take in a greater variety
of parties and interests."61 Adams sought to control
parties within a balanced government. Adams, when
discussing medieval Florence, blamed the fall of the
Florentine republic on its unicameral legislature rather
than its small size.62
Adams had always hoped for a republic based on virtue.
In Defence of the Constitutions. Adams argued that balance
might compensate for the lack of virtue. "The best
republics will be virtuous, and have been so; but we may
hazard a conjecture, that the virtues have been the effects
of a well-ordered constitution, rather than the cause,"
Adams wrote, "and perhaps it would be impossible to prove
60"Defence," vol. 1, in ibid, 4:381-382.
61Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. The
Federalist. Jacob E. Cooke, ed. (Middletowm, Conn.: Wesleyan
University Press, 1961), 64.
"Defence," vol. 2, in John Adams, Works. 5:22.
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that a republic cannot exist even among highwaymen, by
setting one rogue to watch another: and the knaves
themselves may be made honest by the struggle.” J This
represented Adams's final break with the classical world,
that virtue was not necessary to start a republic. Adams
believed virtue was still possible, but would not risk a
government on it.
Adams' diplomatic career during the American
Revolution reflects both the optimistic and pessimistic
trends in his political philosophy. Because America was a
young nation, Adams believed it should avoid the corruption
of a European alliance. Even if American society was not as
virtuous as Adams previously believed, Adams feared a
foreign alliance would harm America by dragging it into
European wars. Because Adams regarded America as a
commercial nation, he sought to expand trade through the
Model Treaty, protect the carrying trade by appealing to
the Armed Neutrality, and protect American rights to the
fisheries. Because Adams believed in the rule of law, he
accepted the French alliance, and because Adams believed
that leaders should be virtuous, he objected to Franklin's
personal style of diplomacy. Above all, Adams believed that
63"Defence,” vol. 3, in ibid. 6:219.
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American independence, like American liberty, could be
preserved through a balance of power.

PART III

THE DIPLOMACY OF A SHORT WAR
1775-1776

John Adams believed in a balance of power in both
government and international relations. Balance of power
diplomacy fit into his conception that, as a force hostile
to freedom, power had to be checked for freedom to survive.
In the international arena, the unchecked power of one
nation could threaten the freedom of others. Although
Americans could create constitutions that balanced
executive, legislative, and judicial powers at home,
America could not as easily balance the power of Great
Britain. Adams was certain that America would one day be as
powerful as Great Britain, and his belief in America as a
rising empire influenced his ideas of diplomacy. According
to legend, the Pilgrims carved the phrase, "The eastern
nations sink, their glory ends/ An empire rises where the
sun descends," on Plymouth Rock. Adams believed the phrase,
if not the legend. Adams had accepted Benjamin Franklin's
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theory that the American population would double every 20
years.64 Adams wrote in 1755, "if we can remove the
turbulent Gallicks, our People according to the exactest
Computations, will in another Century, become more numerous
than England itself. Should this be the Case, since we have
(I may say) all

the naval stores of the Nation in ourhands

it will be easy

to obtain mastery of the seas, and than the

united force of

all Europe will not be able to subdue

us."65 When the

Britons became turbulent in 1775 and

1776, the Continental Congress faced the problem of how to
shepherd this growing, but still weak, nation through the
American Revolution without being destroyed by Great
Britain. To Adams, in 1775 and 1776, the answer lay in
creating a balance of power on the North American continent
by conquering Canada, and a balance in diplomacy by using
American commerce.
Adams fully supported the 1775 American invasion of
Canada, writing in his autobiography that he was "wholly
occupied" by its conduct. ° Congress, m

planning the

invasion, had the dual political agenda of presenting a
f.A

,

James H. Hutson. John Adams and the Diplomacy of the
American Revolution (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1980), 1-8.
DJohn Adams to Nathan Webb, Oct. 12, 1755, in Adams,
Papers, 1:5.
John Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 3:327.
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united front against Great Britain and appealing to the
Canadians as fellow Americans suffering from British
oppression.67 Adams probably believed that strategic
reasons for taking Canada were more important. France had
used Canada as a base from which to attack British
settlements. The Americans could expect the same from the
British. "In the Hands of our Enemies, it [Canada] would
enable them [the British] to influence all the Indians upon
the Continent to take up the Hatchet," Adams wrote to James
Warren, "and commit their Robberies and Murder upon the
Frontiers of all the Southern Colonies as well as pour down
Regulars Canadian and Indians together upon the Borders of
the Northern."68
Two different, and uncoordinated, American forces
attacked Canada. In July of 1775, Congress ordered General
Philip Schuyler to invest Fort Ticonderoga, and from there
moved up the Richelieu River to Montreal. Schuyler remained
at Ticonderoga until General Richard Montgomery advanced to
Lake Champlain in September. George Washington, on his own
accord, sent a force under Colonel Benedict Arnold from
eg
Cambridge, through Maine, to Canada. *
The Americans were initially successful. Montgomery
67Don Higginbotham. The War of American Independence (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), 108.
68John Adams to James Warren, Feb. 18, 1776, in John Adams,
Papers, 4:28.
^Higginbotham, War for Independence. 109-110.
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lay seige to St. Johns in October, and took the fort after
55 days. General Sir Guy Carleton retreated before
Montgomery's advancing force, and Montgomery took Montreal
in November. Montgomery, upon learning that Arnold had
reached Canada, left a garrison at Montreal and took 375
men to meet Arnold. Montgomery joined Arnold's 675 men on
December 2, at Point aux Trembles, 20 miles from
Quebec.70
The Americans did not have enough supplies to lay
seige to Quebec and had to attack before Arnold's troops,
whose enlistments were up on December 31, left. The
Americans attacked on the snowy night of December 30. The
attack failed, and Montgomery was killed.71
In February 1776, Adams proposed a commission be sent
to Canada. Congress selected Benjamin Franklin, Samuel
Chase of Maryland, who supported the invasion of Canada,
and two Catholics, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, a member
of the Maryland safety committee, and John Carroll, a
Jesuit priest.72 In the instructions to the
commissioners, dated March 20, 1776, Adams took great pains
to show that French Catholics would be welcome in a union
with American Protestants. "You are to ... declare, that we
70 ibid. 111-112.
71ibid. 112-114.
72Thomas O'Brien Hanley. Revolutionary Statesman; Charles
Carroll and the War (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1983),
101-103, 109.
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hold sacred the rights of conscience," Adams wrote, "and
may promise the whole people, solemnly in our name, the
free and unfettered exercise of their religion; and, to
theclergy, the full, perfect, and peaceable possession and
enjoyment of all their estates."73
Upon reaching Canada, the commissioners realized their
political mission was as hopeless as the military effort
had become. Franklin noted that the French Catholics were
hostile to America, and that at least half of the few
Canadian Protestants were Loyalists. Franklin saw no reason
to continue the mission and left Canada on May ll.74
Before he left, the commisioners reported to President John
Hancock that, if Congress had no hard money for the
Canadian campaign, "it would be advisable, in our opinion,
to withdraw our army and fortify the passes on the lakes to
prevent the enemy, and the Canadians, if so inclined, from
making irruptions into and depredations on our
frontiers."75 Charles Carroll wrote in his journal of the
"bad prospect of our affairs in Canada."76 Congress
73
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learned of the failure of the Canadian mission in June.
Adams blamed the loss of Canada on congressional
indecision, lack of information regarding the political
situation in Canada, lack of a competent general after
Montgomery's death, and a general lack of supplies, money,
men, and medicine.77
As the Canadian debacle demonstrated, America could
not defeat Great Britain completely on her own. America
needed an ally, and the logical choice was France. However,
the need for a foreign alliance created two problems. The
first was whether an alliance should precede or follow
formal independence. America was already acting like an
independent nation. Would a formal declaration do any good,
especially in view of the fact that America had no
.

7ft

»

.

alliances?'0 Radicals like Samuel Adams urged Congress to
charge forward. "Is not America already independent?" he
wrote to Samuel Cooper; "Why then not declare it?"79
Members opposed to independence feared that by cutting its
last link to Great Britain, America would be at the mercy
77John Adams to Samuel Cooper? June 9, 1776, in John Adams,
Papers, 4:242-243.
78Jack N. Rakove. The Beginnings of National Politics (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 89.
79Samuel Adams to Samuel Cooper, April 3, 1776, in Paul H.
Smith, ed. Letters of Delegates to Congress 1774-1789. 16
vols. to date (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress,
1976.), 3:481.
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of foreign powers, "When We have bound ourselves to an
eternal Quarrel with G.B. by a Declaration of
Independence," John Dickinson said in his July 1, 1776 ,
speech against independence, "France has nothing to do but
hold back and intimidate G.B. till Canada is put into her
Hands, then to intimidate Us into a most disadvantageous
Grant of our Trade."80 John Adams argued that, instead of
needing a foreign alliance in order to declare
independence, America needed formal independence before
anynation would sign an alliance. "[F]oreign powers could
not be expected to acknowledge Us," Adams wrote, "till We
had acknowledged ourselves and taken our Station, among
them as a sovereign Power, and Independent Nation."OJAdams dismissed Dickinson's fears of French domination,
because America did not seek a political or military
alliance. "I wish for nothing but Commerce," Adams
wrote.8 2
The second problem with a foreign alliance, more
specifically a French alliance, was the question of the
nature of such an alliance. Adams believed America should
offer only a commercial treaty. Adams thought France, out
of a desire to gain at British expense, would enter the war
80John
4:354.
81John
82John
Adams,

Dickinson's speech notes, July 1, 1776, in ibid.
Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 3:327.
Adams to John Winthrop, June 23, 1776, in John
Papers. 4:331-332.
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without a formal military alliance. Besides, a political or
military treaty might upset the international balance of
0 0

.

p o w e r . I t was not m

.

.

.

America's interest, Adams wrote m

his autobiography, to enter into any European war, either
to ally with France to destroy Great Britain, or to ally
with Great Britain to destroy France. Americans learned
after 1763 that freedom was in danger if any one nation
O

A

became too powerful. * In March of 1776, Adams argued m
Congress, "is any Assistance attainable from F[ranee]? What
Connection may We safely form with her? 1st. No Political
Connection. Submit to none of her Authority —

receive no

Governors, or Officers from her. 2d. No military
Connection. Receive no Troops from her. 3d. Only a
Commercial Connection."85
Adams believed that American commerce would create a
balance between Great Britain and France that would allow
the United States to remain independent. All European
nations would want American trade, as Thomas Paine put it,
"while eating is the custom of Europe."86 Adams wanted to
break the British monopoly on American commerce, opening
markets to France and other countries, as well as Great
Britain. Both Great Britain and France would benefit from

88Shaw, Character of John Adams. 281-282.
8^John Adams, Diary and Autobiography. 3:329.
85ibid, 2:236.
86Thomas Paine. Common Sense (1776), (New York: The Viking
Press, 1987), 83.
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American commerce, and neither of them would attack the
•

•

•

United States, for fear of retribution from the other.

87

Congress placed John Adams in charge of a committee to
draft a treaty of alliance that would serve as the model
for American treaties with European powers. The treaty
became known as the Model Treaty. On September 17, 1776,
Adams presented his draft of the Model Treaty. Adams, in
writing the treaty, was influenced by the Treaty of
88
.
Utrecht.00 The 1713 Anglo-French Treaty of Utrecht, which
ended the War of the Spanish Succession, gave mutual
most-favored-nation status and established free navigation
m•

•
•
8Q
the signatories'
European po s s e s s•i o n s .
3 The Model

Treaty's 30 articles guaranteed reciprocal trade,
protection for each nation's ships in the other's ports,
and a narrow definition of contraband —
ships' stores —

excluding food and

that emphasized the principle of "free

ships, free goods.” The only military concessions were that
the United States would remain neutral (rather than ally
with Great Britain)

if Great Britain declared war on France

as a result of the treaty, and that the United States would
not make a separate peace with Great Britain. Furthermore,
the treaty barred France from taking any British colonies
87

•

.

°'Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 28-31.
°°Model Treaty, editorial note, in John Adams, Papers.
4:263.
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•
•
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.
.
...
in North America. u Congress did permit some flexibility
in presenting the treaty to France. On September 24,
President Hancock informed the American commisioners in
Paris that the article guaranteeing the safety of American
ships in French harbors should be insisted upon. However,
clauses relating to protection from the Barbary pirates and
West Indian duties were not to hold up progress on signing
the treaty. If asked to, the American envoys were allowed
to give a more elaborate and explicit pledge not to ally
with Great Britain if Great Britain declared war as a
result of the treaty.91
American diplomacy to 1776 seems to have been based on
the presumption that the revolution would be a short war.
If America took Canada, Great Britain would have no
foothold in North America and presumably would have to give
in to American demands. It is possible that Congress
believed that, when faced with the loss of American trade
and the threat of French intervention, Great Britain would
back down, preferring peace with an independent United
States to war with both America and France. The Committee
of Secret Correspondence wrote to the American
commissioners in Paris that many believed, "the war might
Q0
,
^ M o d e l Treaty, in John Adams, Papers. 4:265-277.
9Worthington Chauncey Ford, et a l . eds. Journals of the
Continental Congress 1774-1789. 34 vols. (Washington, D.C.:
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soon be concluded, so were our military arrangements
accommodated."92 However, the war was going badly. The
Americans, as already seen, failed to take Canada. The
British army, under General Sir William Howe, captured New
York City, marched in triumph through New Jersey, and
established winter quarters outside of Philadelphia.
•

Q “I

Congress fled to Baltimore. J Congress backed away from
the Model Treaty. On December 30, the Committee of Secret
Correspondence ordered the American commissioners to do
whatever was needed to bring France or any other European
,

,

,

q

a

.

nation into the war as soon as possible. * Despite John
Adams's hopes and efforts, the United States could not win
its independence without a military alliance. The question
for Adams became less how to avoid plunging into European
politics, and more how to plunge in without drowning
American freedom.

go
,
,
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PART IV

JOHN ADAMS IN PARIS
1777-1779

The American envoys at Paris and John Adams moved at
different paces toward the realization that the United
States had to offer more than a commercial treaty to get
France to enter the war. The Americans in Paris, Benjamin
Franklin, Arthur Lee of Virginia, and Silas Deane of
Connecticut, took the initiative in offering a closer
connection. The Comte de Vergennes, the French foreign
minister, saw the trap John Adams had laid for him.
Vergennes knew that the United States wanted to deflect the
war from the United States to Europe. If Adams intended to
use France to secure American independence, Vergennes
intended to use the United States to increase French power
relative to Great Britain. To do this, Vergennes needed
greater assurances that America would continue to
,

Q C

,

,

fight. J The American commissioners moved to reassure
Q C

,

Gerald Stourzh. Beniamin Franklin and American Foreign
Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 136-140.
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Vergennes. In March 1777, they proposed that France and the
United States share the Canadian fisheries, that France
help the United States conquer continental British
possessions in exchange for American help against the
British West Indies, and that the United States declare war
on British-allied Portugal if Spain entered the war on the
American side.96 John Adams held out against a close
connection with France.

”1 have very often been ashamed to

hear so many Whiggs groaning and sighing with Despondency,
and whining out their Fears that We must be subdued unless
France shold step in,” Adams wrote in disgust to James
Warren, "Are We to be beholden to France for our
Liberties?"97
On November 7, 1777, Congress appointed John Adams to
replace Silas Deane as a commissioner to France. Adams set
sail on February 13, 1778.98 Adams's mission accomplished
nothing in terms of actual policy. However, the mission
plunged Adams into personal and policy disputes that helped
shape his view and system of diplomacy.
According to Charles Francis Adams, John Adams
accepted the appointment to France, at the urging of
congressional allies such as Henry Laurens, Richard Henry
96The American Commissioners to Vergennes, March 14, 1777,
in Franklin, Papers. 23:504-505.
97John Adams to James Warren, May 3, 1777, in John Adams,
Papers. 5:174.
98Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 33-34.
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Lee and James Lovell, in order to carry out his ideas of a
•
,
go
proper foreign policy. * Adams would not get that
chance.He arrived at Bordeaux on April 1, 1778, only to
find that Franklin, Lee, and Deane had signed commercial
and military treaties with France on February 6,
accomplishing the goal of Adams7 mission.100 Despite
earlier misgivings, Adams came to support the military
treaty. As long as Great Britain held territory in North
America, the United States needed French support.101 "We
... have the surest Ground to expect the Jealousy and
Hatred of Great Britain," Adams wrote to Samuel Adams,
"[therefore] We have the Strongest Reasons to depend upon
the Friendship and Alliance of France."102
Just as important, the treaties, once signed, held the
force of American and international law. If the United
States did not fulfill its obligations under the law, it
could expect no further help from Europe. "This faith [in
upholding the treaty] is our American Glory, and it is our
Bulwark," Adams wrote to James Warren, "it is the only
Foundation on which our Union can rest securely, it is the
only Support of our Credit both in Finance and Commerce, it
is our sole Security for the Assistance of Foreign
qq
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powers.”103 Adams believed French support was solid,
informing Samuel Adams that, "Every suspicion of a
waveringdisposition in this court concerning the support of
America is groundless."104
Adams came to disapprove of the conduct of two of his
collegues, Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin. Before Adams
arrived, Arthur Lee accused Silas Deane of mixing his
personal finances with those of the embassy. Franklin
generally backed Deane against Lee. Adams arrived in France
neutral toward Deane, and generally favorable toward
Franklin and Arthur Lee, and hoping to keep out of
conflicts within the commission.105 Adams soon became
involved in the aftermath of the Silas Deane affair. Deane
had left Paris before Adams arrived. Congress recalled
Deane on August 5, 1777, because Deane had granted too many
commissions to non-English-speaking French officers. Soon
Congress learned that Deane had used his position to
further his private commercial interests.

Arthur Lee,

who had clashed with Deane in Paris, wrote to Congress
103John Adams to James Warren, August 4, 1778, in ibid.
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accusing Deane of corruption.107 Deane counterattacked at
his first opportunity. He wrote an "Address to the Free and
Virtuous Citizens of America," published in the
Pennsylvania Packet on December 5, 1778. In this address,
Deane accused the Lee family in general and Arthur Lee in
particular of treason and disloyalty to the Franco-American
alliance. The story reached Paris in February of 1779. John
Adams was outraged at Deane's behavior, and Deane's attacks
on Adams' allies, the Lees.108 "That there appeared to me
no Alternative left but the Ruin of Mr. Deane, or the Ruin
of his Country," Adams wrote in his diary, "That he
appeared to me in the Light of a wild Boar, that ought to
be hunted down for the Benefit of Mankind."109
Adams came into conflict with Franklin as well. Adams,
the stern New Englander, disapproved of Franklin's
hedonistic lifestyle.110 Adams also resented the
attention Franklin received in Paris. Adams believed that
the image of the "backwoods philosopher" Franklin
cultivated was fraudulent and that he had a better claim to
1 rj7

,

,
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the title than the worldly Doctor Franklin.111 More
important, Adams and Franklin clashed over policy. Just as
Adams called for a government of laws and not men, he
advocated a diplomacy based on interests and not diplomats.
Interest was the firm basis for a long-term policy.112
Franklin based his diplomacy on his personal relationship
with the French. Franklin overflowed with gratitude toward
France for its generous help in public displays that Adams
found distateful. Franklin played on Louis XVI's ego rather
than French interest alone.11** Here is the beginning of
two conflicting systems of diplomacy; long-range,
interest-based diplomacy and short-range, personality-based
diplomacy.
Despite his feelings toward Franklin, Adams believed
that it would do more harm than good to remove the doctor.
"Yet such is his fame on both sides of the water," Adams
wrote to Thomas McKean, "that it is best, perhaps, that he
should be left there [in France]."114 Congress did just
that on September 14, 1778, reorganizing the diplomatic
corps and making Franklin sole minister in Paris. Adams
received the news on February 12, 1779. After several
months of trying to leave, Adams sailed for America on June
ij-^Shaw, Character of John Adams. 118.
112Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 11.
112Stourzh, Franklin and Foreign Policy. 155-156, 164-165.
114John Adams to Thomas McKean, September 20, 1779, in
Wharton, ed. Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence. 3:332.
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17, 1779, arriving at Boston on August 2.115
Sitting on the docks at Nantes, waiting for a ship
home, John Adams had time to draw some disturbing
conclusions about his tour in France, Silas Deane had
returned home and denounced Adams's allies, the Lees.
Congress made Deane's ally, Franklin, sole minister to
France and left Adams without a job, or even a formal
letter of recall. Adams concluded that Franklin was the
agent of his destruction.116

And was it a coincidence

that Franklin was the French favorite? Adams took his
suspicions home to America. When he returned to Europe,
Adams believed it was his mission to guard American
independence, against both its allies and its enemies.

115Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 41,
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PART V

ALLIES AND ENEMIES
1779-1782

John Adams spent the summer and early fall of 1779
writing the constitution of Massachusetts. When he returned
to Europe in late 1779 he pursued an agenda dictated more
by his beliefs and experiences than by Congress. Over the
next three years, Adams broadly construed his powers as
peace commissioner so as to include any actions needed to
force Great Britain to negotiate. Adams sought to base
American diplomacy on American interest, and he defined
American interests as persuading the French to provide
naval cover and tying as many nations as possible to the
American cause. In this way, Adams tried to defend American
independence against all threats, whether concealed or
open, whether from allies or enemies.
As many Americans feared, John Adams included, the
French alliance dragged the United States further into
European politics. In January 1779, Congress reaffirmed the
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provisions of the 1778 treaty forbidding either side from
making a separate peace with Great Britain.117 America
had already made concessions to get France into the war.
Spain was the next diplomatic target. Conrad Alexandre
Gerard, the French minister to the United States, tried to
make American demands acceptable to Spain. The recall of
Silas Deane helped further French influence. Gerard
personally supported the pro-Deane moderates against the
pro-Lee radicals, and used his influence to whittle down
•
110
American peace demands.
The United States began with a fairly ambitious list
of peace demands. On February 23, 1779, the congressional
committee created to draft the peace ultimata recommended
that the United States demand absolute independence,
control of territory to the Mississippi River, British
evacuation of American territory, American rights to the
Newfoundland fisheries, free navigation of the Mississippi,
free commerce on the Mississippi below the American
boundary, and either the cession or independence of Nova
Scotia. Gerard tried to moderate these demands to make them
more acceptable to Great Britain and less threatening to
Spain, which entered the war as a French (but not American)
1 17
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ally on April 12, 1779.119 Gerard used his influence to
have Congress drop its demand for the fisheries. ^
Congress complied. On August 14, 1779, Congress made
absolute independence and control of territory west to the
Mississippi and south to 31* north latitude its demands.
.

.

.

.

1

9

The fisheries were not to hold up peace negotiations.

1

Gerard also pushed for John Jay to be elected peace
commissioner and replace Arthur Lee as minister to Spain.
Gerard achieved only partial victory. In September of 1779,
radicals in Congress led by Samuel Adams and the rest of
the Massachusetts delegation, opposed Jay's nomination. The
radicals, having lost the fisheries as a peace ultimatim,
sought to elect John Adams, who, despite the decision,
would seek American rights to the fisheries in any
negotiations. Congress was deadlocked until the radicals
and moderates agreed to divide the positions of peace
commissioner and minister to Spain. Congressional radicals
abandoned Arthur Lee, and Congress elected Adams peace
commissioner and Jay minister to Spain on September

1 1Q ,
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Adams learned of his appointment, much to his
surprise, in October. Elbridge Gerry urged him to accept,
and Adams agreed that the commission was too important to
turn down. However, Adams believed Franklin would attempt
to frustrate his mission, and asked that Congress order
Franklin to authorize payments to him. Adams sailed for
Europe on November 13, 1779. En route, the ship began
.

leaking and put m

1 o1

t

at El Ferrol, Spain, on December 8. *

Neither Vergennes nor John Adams looked forward to
seeing each other again. In the summer of 1779, Gerard
reported to Vergennes that John Adams, Samuel Adams and
Richard Henry Lee were part of a pro-British faction. Adams
and Vergennes therefore clashed on first contact over
whether or not to inform London of Adams's powers to treat
for peace. Adams's insistence on telling the British of his
commission served to convince Vergennes that Adams was,
after all, pro-British.124 Adams hoped to determine
British intentions and believed that revealing his
commission, ‘'would . . . draw out from them some proofs of
their present designs, and it is always important to
discover early the intention of the enemy."125 Vergennes
believed such a move premature. Great Britain had made no
1 O')

,

,

t

■■^''Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 51-55.
124ibid. 56-59.
125John Adams to Vergennes, July 17, 1780, in John Adams,
Works. 7:228-229.
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peace overtures, and offering peace and commerce would only
convince the British that America would cave in to British
demands.126
Adams differed with Vergennes over military strategy
as well as negotiating strategy. Many Americans believed
that America needed only French sea power to defeat Great
•

•

Britain.

197

i

Adams tended to agree. f,A Navy is our

natural, and our only adequate defense,” Adams wrote to
Samuel Huntington, president of the Continental
Congress.However,

Spain and France concentrated on

British rather than American waters. A Franco-Spanish fleet
attempted to invade Great Britain. The allied fleet did not
join until July 22, 1779, and because of further delays and
shipboard illness, it allowed the British fleet to escape
to Portsmouth on August 31. The Franco-Spanish fleet
retreated from the English Channel on September 8.129
Adams believed these vast forces might be more
profitably deployed in American waters. He reported to
Huntington in March 1780 on the strength of the French
126Observations on Mr. J. Adams letter of July 17, 1780, in
Wharton, ed. Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence. 4:3-6.
127Stinchcombe, American Revolution and French Alliance.
151.
12 John Adams to Samuel Huntington, October 14, 1780, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 101.
129Jonathan R. Dull. The French Navv and American
Independence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1975), 154-157.
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fleet, writing, "one would think that there was force
enough in them to protect Us and quiet all our Fears but
the Battle is not always to the strong and we must wait for
Time to decide Events."130 Adams criticized allied naval
action in Europe, especially after he learned of Admiral
Rodney's January 16, 1780, victory over the Spanish at
Gibraltar.131 Adams complained that vast fleets were
wasted on Gibraltar, "which is but a Trifle," while even a
smaller French fleet would triumph off America.132 Adams
spent much of his time in Paris pelting Vergennes with
advice on naval policy. In a letter of July 13, Adams
warned that some in the United States were still suspicious
of the French. A show of naval force in American waters
would reassure the country, and could force the British out
•

•

•

•

* 1 3

of Philadelphia and isolate them in New York City.

3

Vergennes, with a smaller fleet than the British and a
reluctant ally in Spain, could not accommodate Adams. Adams
concluded that Vergennes wanted to see America independent,
but not let it grow strong.134
Vergennes and Adams already had enough to argue about,
John Adams to Samuel Huntington, March 4, 1780, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 98.
131Dull, French Navv and Independence. 178-179.
132John Adams to Samuel Huntington, March 10, 1780, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 98.
133John Adams to Vergennes, July 13, 1780, Adams Family
Papers, Letterbook, reel 99.
13 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 68-70.
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but Congress added one more issue. On March 18, 1780,
Congress devalued its worthless paper currency at the rate
of $40 in paper to one silver dollar. Vergennes asked Adams
to intercede on behalf of French merchants. Adams saw no
reason for French merchants to be treated differently from
anyone else holding Continental paper and refused.
Vergennes had always questioned Adams's loyalty to the
alliance, and with Adams's actions in the summer of 1780,
he was convinced of Adams's disloyalty. Vergennes had had
enough of Adams and asked the Chevalier de la Luzerne,
Gerard's replacement in America, to ask Congress to recall
Adams.135 Both Adams and Vergennes appealed to Franklin
for support against the other.

Vergennes leaned on

Franklin, asking him to put the matter before Congress and
to urge Congress to respond in a manner pleasing to the
king.137 Franklin dutifully complied, attacking Adams and
defending his own policy of stategic flattery. "He [Adams]
thinks ... that America has been too free in Expressions of
Gratitude to France," Franklin wrote to Huntington, "I
apprehend that he mistakes his Ground, and that this Court
is to be treated with Decency and Delicacy."138
135ibid, 60-63, 69.
136Shaw.
Adams.
;---------' 139.
,
1 07
' Character of
;-- John
■LJ'Vergennes to Benjamin Franklin, June 30, 1780, in
Benjamin Franklin. The Writings of Beniamin Franklin, vols.
7-9. Albert Henry Smyth, ed. New York: The Macmillan Company,
1907), 8:117.
138Benjamin Franklin to Samuel Huntington, August 9, 1780,
in ibid. 8:127.
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Once again, interest- and personality-based diplomacy,
represented by Adams and Franklin, clashed. And once again,
personality-based diplomacy ruled in Paris. According to
Peter Shaw, "Adams relied ... on a straightforward plethora
of information, exortation, and argument."13^ However,
Versailles was no place for straightforwardness. Adams saw
little more that he could do in Paris. On July 27, 1780, he
left to pursue American interests in The Netherlands.140
On September 16, 1780, Adams received permission to
negotiate with the Dutch until Henry Laurens, the American
minister to The Netherlands, arrived. Laurens would never
reach The Netherlands, as the British captured him at sea
on September 3, leaving Adams as de facto minister.141
While Adams was in The Netherlands, American interests
seemed to coincide with Dutch entrance into the Armed
Neutrality. The Armed Neutrality had its origins in July of
1778, when an American privateer attacked eight British
cargo ships sailing out of Archangel, Russia. Catherine II
of Russia proposed a treaty with Denmark in August, calling
for mutual protection of neutral ships and British ships
trading with neutrals. Catherine II issued the Declaration
of Armed Neutrality on February 28, 1780. Of the five
139Shaw, Character of John Adams. 137-138, 141-144.
140Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 71-73.
141ibid, 78-79.
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principles of the Armed Neutrality, the first three,
freedom of neutrals to trade with belligerents, free ships
make free goods, and a limited definition of contraband
that did not include naval stores, appeared in the Model
Treaty. The fourth principle stated that only an effective
blockade was legal, and the fifth set the first four as the
basis for determining the legality of prizes.142
Adams hoped to link the Armed Neutrality to the
American war effort. If France would not send ships to
America, perhaps the Northern Powers could tie up the
British fleet in Europe. Adams reported the formation of
the Armed Neutrality to Huntington, adding that the Dutch
were about to join. With a solid bloc of northern neutrals
against Great Britain, Adams wrote, "either the War will be
pushed this year with more Vivacity than ever, both by Land
and by Sea, or that Peace will be made without delay."143
Congress shared Adams's enthusiasm, and in the summer of
1780 Congress sent Francis Dana, Adams' secretary, to apply
for American membership in the Armed Neutrality.144
1A?
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Samuel Flagg Bemis. The Diplomacy of the American
Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957),
150-156.
143John Adams to Samuel Huntington, April 1780, Adams
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Events pushed The Netherlands into the Armed Neutrality.
When the British captured Henry Laurens, they also captured
evidence of Dutch-American cooperation. The Dutch joined
the Armed Neutrality for their own protection on November
20, and the British authorized attacks on Dutch shipping on
December 20. The Dutch appealed to Russia for help on
January 12, 1781. Adams hoped that the Armed Neutrality
would join the war, forcing Great Britain to negotiate for
peace and lessening American dependence on France. Adams's
hopes, along with the Armed Neutrality itself, collapsed
when Russia refused to go to war for the Dutch.145
As Adams tried to expand American contacts, Vergennes
moved to cut French losses. By February 1781, Vergennes
believed the American war effort was nearly spent. American
arms had fared badly in 1780. Charleston fell to the
British, and Lord Cornwallis and the turncoat Benedict
Arnold cut deeply into the Carolinas and Virginia. In
additon, the war put a strain on the French economy.
Vergennes believed that the United States should settle on
the grounds of territory possessed. Great Britain would
give up New York City, but keep Georgia and South Carolina.
Russia and Austria, neither of which recognized American
145Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 79-82,
93.
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independence, offered mediation, and Vergennes accepted. On
May 21, 1781, the mediators agreed on four preliminary
bases for negotiation; l)all proposals would be heard at
Vienna, and mediation would be extended to Great Britain
and its American colonies if those parties requested it,
2)Great Britain and the colonies would sign a separate
peace concurrent with a general peace settlement, 3)during
negotiations, there would be a one-year truce based on
territory held, and 4)negotiations would proceed once the
preliminaries had been accepted.

*1 A C

John Adams was the only American diplomat in Europe
accredited to attend such a peace conference, and Adams did
not approve of the bases for negotiation. He specifically
objected to the idea of a truce without a formal peace.
Adams believed such a truce would only cause another war
later. Adams also told Vergennes that he could not attend a
peace conference that did not recognize American
independence. The mediators referred only to American
colonies.147 "There are no 'American colonies' at war
with Great Britain," Adams testily reminded Vergennes, "The
Power at War is the United States of America."148 By July
of 1781, the mediators themselves had lost interest in
146Morris, Peacemakers. 178-184.
147ibid. 205-206.
148John Adams to Vergennes, July 19, 1781, Adams Family
Papers, Letterbook, reel 105.
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mediation.149
Vergennes retained an interest in getting rid of
Adams. Vergennes had previously ordered Luzerne to
influence Congress to have Adams recalled. By the summer of
1781, Luzerne had his chance. Congress, like Vergennes, was
pessimistic about the military effort. Many in Congress
believed that Adams was the primary obstacle to peace, and
Luzerne encouraged this belief. On June 11, 1781, Congress
voted to order its diplomats in Europe to do nothing
without the approval of the French. Only Massachusetts and
Connecticut opposed the order. Congress expanded the peace
commission to five members on June 14, adding Benjamin
Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson.
James Madison delivered the final blow on July 11, when at
the urging of Luzerne's secretary, Louis Barbe-Marbois, he
moved that Congress revoke Adams's commission to negotiate
a commercial treaty. Congress passed the motion 7-2, again
with only Massachusetts and Connecticut opposed.150 Adams
received his new commission on August 24.151
While waiting to use his peace commission, Adams
1dQ
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tended to American interests in The Netherlands. American
arms, rather than Adams' efforts, led to Dutch recognition.
The American victory at Yorktown in October 1781 led the
British Parliament, on February 27, 1782, to prohibit any
further offensive action in America. The removal of an open
British threat allowed the Dutch to recognize and sign a
commercial treaty with the United States.152
In September of 1782 Adams received the call he had
been awaiting. John Jay informed him that Great Britain had
acknowledged American independence, and peace negotiations
could begin.153 Adams believed that he had been beset by
a multitude of plagues: a weak and unreliable Congress, an
untrustworthy collegue in Franklin, and a devious ally in
Vergennes. Despite all of these difficulties, Adams left
The Hague for Paris to secure peace and American
independence.

*52ibid. 110-114.
153ibid. 116.

PART VI

PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE
1782-1783

By 1782, a war that began as a colonial rebellion
against British rule had ballooned into a war involving
several European powers, all with individual war aims that
were not necessarily in the interest of the United States.
"The Political Machine that is now in Motion is so vast,
and comprehends so many nations, whose Interests are not
easy to adjust," Adams reported to Huntington, "that it is
perhaps impossible for human understanding to forsee what
events might occur to disturb it."154 That machine began
to divide the alliance and make the British more
concilliatory. Jay and Franklin met with Vergennes on
August 10, 1782. While Jay objected to the fact that
British peace commissioner Richard Oswald's commission did
not recognize American independence, Vergennes did not.
154John Adams to Samuel Huntington, December 6, 1780, Adams
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 101.
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Joseph-Matthias Gerard de Reyneval, an advisor to
Vergennes, added that American claim of the Mississippi as
the western boundary was extravagant, and Vergennes
agreed.The meeting convinced Jay that the Americans might
have to violate their instructions and sign a separate
peace.155 The Earl of Shelburne, the British prime
minister, seemed ready to give the Americans what they
wanted. Great Britain had enough enemies and needed to
split the alliance. Shelburne believed the territory north
of the Ohio River was lost. Better to give it to the
Americans, who would continue to trade with Great Britain,
than to give it to France or Spain.156
Jay submitted a draft treaty on October 5. It called
for recognition of American independence and British
evacuation of American territory. It set American
boundaries at the Mississippi on the west, 31® north
latitude on the south, the St. Lawrence River and 45° north
latitude on the northwest, and the St. John's River to the
Bay of Fundy on the northeast. The draft gave the United
States the right to catch and dry fish off Newfoundland,
and granted free navigation of the Mississippi to Great
Britain and the United States. Oswald appoved of the
155Morris, Peacemakers. 307-310.
156Dull, Diplomatic History. 145-147.
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treaty, but the cabinet rejected it on October 17. The
cabinet wanted to keep the Americans out of the fisheries,
establish a Maine boundary more advantageous to Great
Britain, and make some provision for American Tories.
John Adams arrived in Paris on October 26. He was still
suspicious of Vergennes and Franklin, but discovered that
JaY/ previously connected with the pro-Deane moderates, was
now anti-French.158 "Mr. Jay likes Frenchmen as little as
Mr. Lee and Mr. Izard did," Adams noted with some
satisfaction in his diary, "Our Allies dont play fair, he
1RQ
. . .
.
.
told me."A 3 Adams joined in the negotiations on October
30, and sessions ran daily until November 4. Great Britain
accepted the western and southern boundaries. Both sides
agreed on the St. Croix River as the Maine boundary, but
could not agree on which of the three St. Croix Rivers that
meant. In a partial concession to the British, Adams
offered to have Americans pay debts to Britons incurred
before 1775.

1 60

•

Adams also wrote an article granting the

Americans the right to fish off Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia.161
Fish and Tories remained sticking points. By November
•^^Morris, Peacemakers. 346-350.
15 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution.
117-119.
1 diary entry of November 5, 1782, in John Adams, Diary
and Autobiography. 3:46-47.
16^Morris, Peacemakers. 361-363.
161John Adams, Diary and Autobiography. 3:45-46.
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11, the British accepted the loss of the northwest. The
British were willing to exclude the most outspoken American
Tories from compensation for lands seized, but did insist
on compensation for neutrals. Adams opposed compensation,
fearing that it would create British and French parties in
the United States. The British watered down the demand for
compensation to an official request, which the Americans
accepted. 162
The final sessions began on November 25. The
fisheries, perhaps the main reason John Adams was in
Europe, remained the final issue. Adams, of course, was
long familiar with the issue. MMy Practice as a Barrister
in the Counties of Essex Plymouth and Barnstable had
introduced me to more Knowledge both of the Cod and whale
fisheries and of their importance both to the commerce and
Naval Power of this Country than any other man possessed,"
Adams wrote in his autobiography.163 Adams believed that
one day the United States would be a great naval power, and
access to the fisheries was the beginning of that power.
For the next three days, Adams defended American rights to
the fisheries by the same method he gave advice to
Vergennes —

he buried Oswald in an avalanche of fact and

162Morris, Peacemakers. 367-369, 372-373.
John Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 4:5.
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argument. Adams' main point throughout was that granting
American rights to the fisheries was safer than making
concessions to France. The fisheries were a training ground
for sailors. Was it not safer to allow the Americans to
addto their tiny navy than to allow the French to add to
theirs? The fisheries were a great source of profit. If the
Americans shared in the fisheries, much of their profits
would wind up in London in trade. Could the British expect
the same from the French? The fisheries were a source of
contention. Would it not be better to remove sources of
Anglo-American conflict and restore trade than to exclude
•
.
1fiA
the Americans and drive them closer to the French?
Adams presented a draft article on November 28 that gave
the United States the right to take fish on the Grand Bank
and all other places where Americans used to fish.
Americans would have the liberty to dry fish on Cape Sable
and the unsettled parts of Nova Scotia.165
On November 29 Adams announced that he could
never sign a peace that kept Americans out of the
fisheries.166 The British realized that the negotiations
had come too far to let them collapse over the fisheries.
The British reduced the "right" to the coastal fisheries to
•"jlJohn Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 3:72-74.
165Morris, Peacemakers. 376.
1 John Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 3:81.
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a "liberty," and allowed drying only in uninhabited areas.
The Americans agreed to the compromise, and signed the
Provisional Treaty on November 30, 1782.167 Adams was
pleased with the treaty, even though the American
negotiators had to violate their instructions to obtain it.
"The great Interests of our Country in the West and in the
East are secured, as well as her independence. St. Croix is
the boundary against Nova Scotia. The Fisheries are very
safe, the Mississippi and the Western Lands to the middle
of the Great Lakes are as well secured to Us as they could
be by England," Adams wrote to James Warren, "All of these
Advantages we would not have obtained if we had literally
pursued our Instructions.1,168 Adams also knew that the
treaty was mainly the work of John Jay. Although the French
had called him the "Washington of Negotiation," Adams wrote
in his diary, that title belonged more to Jay.169
The treaty presented Congress with an embarrassing
problem. It could not repudiate a treaty that met, and even
exceeded, its demands. Neither could Congress ignore the
fact that the commissioners openly violated their
instructions. Robert R. Livingston, the secretary of
foreign affairs, sent a letter to the commissioners on
167Morris, Peacemakers. 379-381.
John Adams to James Warren, December 12, 1782, in
Warren-Adams
Letters.
i gn
t-r 2:186.
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March 25, 1783, praising the treaty but expressing
disappointment that the American had not consulted the
French.

170

•

•

,

/u The commissioners defended their blow for

independence against the June 1781 instructions. "Since we
have assumed a Place in the Political System of the World,"
they replied, "let us move like a Primary and not like a
•
Secondary Planet."*171
L'x "It is
a Glory to have broken such

.

.

.

infamous orders," Adams wrote in his diary.

177

'*

The Americans hoped for better terms, particularly
regarding American trade with the British West Indies, in
the final treaty. "The commerce of the West Indies is part
of the American system of commerce," Adams told Secretary
Livingston,"They can neither do without us, nor us without
17
them."-1
-

. .
However, the British
would make no further

concessions to the Americans. The Provisional Treaty
brought down the Shelburne ministry. The succeeding
government, under Lord North and Charles James Fox,
believed that Great Britain had already given away too
much, and insisted on excluding the Americans from the West
17 0

.

.

.

.
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Indian trade. On September 3, 1783, negotiators read the
November 30, 1782, agreement into a general peace
settlement, ending the war.174
Having spent five years in Europe, John Adams
concluded that America was well rid of any political
connection with Europe. "For my own Part I thought

America

had been long enough involved in the Wars of Europe. She
had been a Football from the Beginning, and it was easy to
foresee that France and England both would endeavour to
involve Us in their future Wars,” Adams wrote in his diary,
"I thought [it] our interest and Duty to avoid [them] as
much as possible and to be compleatly independent and have
nothing to do but in Commerce with either of them.”175
Adams was more convinced than ever that only a balance of
power could preserve American independence.176 Adams
adapted a European idea to American ends. Adams hoped to
tie European nations to American success, making American
commerce too valuable a commodity to risk in war. Adams did
believe in the rule of law, but the law of diplomacy was
often the law of the jungle. Adams believed in the sanctity
of treaties, but more so in American survival.
?"74Dull, Diplomatic History. 159-160.
175diary entry, November 11, 1782, in John Adams, Diarv and
Autobiography. 3:52.
1 7 6 H u t s o n . J A anfl Diplomacy of American Revolution.
142-143.
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Adams wrote to Elbridge Gerry the day he signed the
final treaty. To maintain its independence, Adams wrote,
the United States must be able to defend itself. It must
strenthen its union and depend on its own resources rather
than the goodwill of Europe. The United States should send
ministers that will defend American interest, and support
them to the fullest.177 If the United States did all of
this, she would control rather than be contolled by the
balance of power. Then she would be independent.

1 7John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, September 3, 1783, in
Wharton, ed. Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence.
6:669-670.
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